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FROM MEDALS TO MORALITY: SPORTIVE 
NATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF 
DOPING IN SPORTS 
DIONNE L. KOLLER' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Marion Jones is a national hero. While she boosted the prestige of the 
United States during her amazing dominance of track and field, she 
contributed to it even more when she went to prison for lying about her use of 
performance-enhancing substances during that period. This is because 
singling out Jones enabled the United States, unequivocally, to show moral 
outrage over sports doping. Although Major League Baseball was at the time 
mired in a performance-enhancing drug scandal of its own, it was Jones who 
allowed the United States to demonstrate its unwavering resolve and moral 
clarity on the issue. In giving her the maximum six months in prison, Judge 
Kenneth Karas explained that he wanted to send a message to athletes that 
cheating in sports is wrong, stating that "athletes in society ... serve as role 
models to children around the world. When there is a widespread level of 
cheating, it sends all the wrong messages."l Yet Karas, and the government 
officials who supported Jones's harsh penalty, were not just sending a message 
to elite athletes; they were sending a message to the world. Notwithstanding 
the government's tap dancing around the issue of steroid use in professional 
sports, the Jones prison sentence hoped to convey that the United States was 
now officially tough on doping. 2 
It is clear that Marion Jones broke the law when she lied to a grand jury 
inquiring about her performance-enhancing drug use. However, her 
spectacular fall from Olympic champion to convicted felon must be put in its 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge 
Joseph Maher for his assistance with research. 
1. Track Star Marion Jones Sentenced to 6 Months, CNN.COM, Jan. II, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.comJ2008/CRIME/01l11ljones.doping/index.html (explaining that Jones's sentence 
was based on the fact that the use of steroids "affects the integrity of athletic competition" and that he 
hoped her sentence would "have a deterrent factor"). 
2. See MICHAEL D. GIARDINA, SPORTING PEDAGOGlES: PERFORMING CULTURE AND IDENTITY 
IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 99 (2005) (explaining that the "figure of the American athlete - in fact the 
whole of sporting culture in the United States - has become [re]-sutured into the various narratives 
about the contested nature offreedom[s], patriotism[s], and democracy in a post-9/11 moment"). 
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proper context. That Jones was put before a grand jury and asked about her 
perfonnance-enhancing drug use in the Olympic Games would have been 
unimaginable for our government officials not so long ago. When 
international acclaim was to be had simply by winning Olympic medals, the 
United States Government was happy to look the other way while prominent 
athletes were accused of doping violations. Indeed, government officials 
turned a blind eye to mountains of evidence that many of our Olympic athletes 
were winning by doping. Competing against athletes from countries like East 
Germany, the Soviet Union, and China, who were believed to use 
perfonnance-enhancing drugs to achieve athletic success, gave government 
officials no incentive to clean up our doping problem. Marion Jones likely 
had this system in mind when she took her "flaxseed oil" and became 
America's sweetheart. Indeed, had she competed in the 1980s or early 1990s, 
Jones would very likely be in her retirement now, enjoying the riches and 
fame that those now-returned gold medals would bring. Instead, she went to 
prison and helped usher in a new era in the American Olympic Movement. 
The United States still wants to win in Olympic competition, 3 but now we 
must do it with the moral authority that we do not cheat. 
This essay seeks to go behind the common anti-doping rhetoric, which 
explains the doping problem as one of cheating individuals and a misguided 
private sector, to highlight the complexity of the government's relationship to 
Olympic Movement sports and sports doping and the sports paradigm in which 
this relationship takes place. In doing so, we can better understand the 
impulses of a nation that once produced Marion Jones, and others like her, and 
which now purports to be a worldwide leader in the fight against doping. It is 
in understanding the true role of the government in a win-at-all-costs sports 
paradigm that can ensure the anti-doping "cure" is not worse than the disease. 
II. DOPING AND THE TEMPTATION OF ATHLETES 
Reflecting the ethos of American society, doping is routinely portrayed as 
a problem of the individual and not the culture.4 Specifically, doping is a 
3. Amy Shipley, Mettle, Not Medals, is Goal of United States Team; Olympic Officials 
Emphasizing Character Instead of Athletic Achievement, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2008, at Al 
[hereinafter Shipley, Goals of United States Team]. 
4. This is quite unlike the reaction in Canada to doping scandals such as that involving sprinter 
Ben Johnson in the 1988 Olympics. Scholars have noted that the scandals in Canada provoked 
national "shame" and were seen as a "national disgrace." Further, it was noted that "few" blamed 
Johnson or rejected him, but instead the government attempted, through the Dubin Commission and 
other forms of inquiry, to understand the root of the problem and the pressures athletes faced to win. 
Bruce Kidd et aI., Comparative Analysis of Doping Scandals: Canada Russia, and China, in DOPING 
IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 153 (Wayne Wilson & 
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problem of an individual athlete gone wrong, an athlete who chose cheating 
and greed over "clean" competition. Thus, the rhetoric of the anti-doping 
movement is one of misguided individualism, and the temptation to cheat 
rather than "work" for victory. 5 As President Bush stated in his 2004 State of 
the Union address: "the use of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids 
in . .. sports... sends the wrong message - that there are shortcuts to 
accomplishment, and that performance is more important than character."6 
Commentators note that with the rewards for athletic success so great, the 
temptation to cheat is enormous. 7 For instance, scholars have explained the 
doping problem in terms of game theory, the study of how players in a game 
pursue strategies that will maximize their returns by anticipating the actions 
that will be taken by other players. 8 Game theory has been applied to the 
Edward Derse eds., 2001). 
5. Darryl C. Wilson, "Let Them Do Drugs" - A Commentary on Random Efforts at Shot 
Blocking in the Sports Drug Game, 8 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 53, 58-59 (2006) (explaining that it is 
the "outlandish" potential for riches that drives athletes to cheat, because they are drawn to "doing 
whatever it takes to compete and win a potential lifetime of riches."); The Drug Free Sports Act of 
2005: Hearing on H.R. 1862, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of 
the H. Energy and Commerce Comm., 109th Congo 5 (2005) [hereinafter The Drug Free Sports Act of 
2005] (statement of Rep. Cliff Stearns) (explaining that athletes' "better sports through chemistry 
attitude replace [sic] hard work, dedication and honesty as the keys to success for our athletes ... "). 
6. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, I PUB. PAPERS 81, 
87-88 (Jan. 20, 2004). Some have noted, however, that the explanation of peiformance-enhancing 
drug use as a "substitute" for the hard work of training is a mischaracterization. As explained by Paul 
Haagen, "[p]erformance-enhancing substances are not a substitute for training, but an aid to training. 
They cannot transform a bad athlete into a great athlete, nor can they permit even a great athlete to get 
away with not training. They can, however, substantially improve the performance of athletes who 
train hard." Paul H. Haagen, The Players Have Lost that Argument: Doping, Drug Testing and 
Collective Bargaining, 40 NEW ENG. L. REv. 831, 835 (2006). 
7. Matthew J. Mitten, Drug Testing of Athletes - An Internal, Not External, Matter, 40 NEW 
ENG. L. REv. 797, 797 (2006) (explaining that "[i]n today's society, the economic and intangible 
rewards for extra-ordinary athletic achievements and winning performances are substantial. 
Therefore, there is a significant incentive for athletes to maximize their on-field performance, which 
is the paramount objective of sports competition"). Shi-Ling Hsu, What Is a Tragedy of the 
Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REv. 75, 97 (2005); Joshua 
H. Whitman, Winning at All Costs: Using Law & Economics to Determine the Proper Role of 
Government in Regulating the Use of Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Professional Sports, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REv. 459, 459 (2008). 
8. Michael Shermer, The Doping Dilemma, SCI. AM., Apr. 2008, at 82-89. The classic example 
of game theory is the prisoner's dilemma, where an individual and his partner are arrested for a crime 
and held in separate cells. Neither wants to "rat" on the other. The prosecutor gives the each person 
the following options: 1. If one confesses and the other does not, the individual who confessed goes 
free and the other gets three years in prison; 2. If the other prisoner confesses and the first does not, 
the first gets three years and the other goes free; 3. If both prisoners confess, each get two years; 4. If 
both remain silent, then each get one year. With these choices, the logical course is to "rat" on your 
partner and defect from the agreement to keep quiet; David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation and the 
Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331 (2001); Olympics Clean? Not Likely, CHI. 
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athletic context by suggesting that although the rules of the game clearly 
prohibit doping, athletes in sports such as cycling or track and field, where 
doping is prevalent, will defect, and start doping as a way to maximize his or 
her outcomes. Commentators have noted that because performance-enhancing 
substances are so effective, detection is still difficult, and the payoff for using 
such substances is so great, the incentive to use performance-enhancing 
substances, and not compete clean, is high. Once a few athletes choose to 
break ranks and violate the rules to gain a competitive advantage, this induces 
others to do so as well. However, the penalties for doping are such that 
athletes remain silent instead of openly communicating about how to remedy 
the problem. 9 Thus, commentators have explained that doping is rational 
individual behavior given the incentives in place in the current athletic system. 
Athletes who follow the rules, therefore, "feel like suckers."10 The game 
theory explanation is reflected in the actions of American weightlifter Mark 
Cameron, who was caught doping at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games. In 
explaining Cameron's conduct, the head of the United States Olympic 
Committee's (USOC) medical delegation to the Games reportedly stated that 
"he knew his test would be positive but he was playing a game. He felt the 
statistics were on his side and he took the calculated risk that he wouldn't be 
one of the athletes tested. He lost." II 
These explanations of doping are consistent with American rhetoric in a 
host of areas, especially in connection with sports. The focus is on 
individualism and private choice,12 and the drive to be the best. This is an 
explanation frequently advanced by government officials. In the words of 
Senator Joseph Biden: "athletes have always tried to improve their competitive 
advantage and their performance on the playing field ... there's always been a 
history of some using improper substances to be able to do that. . .. It's a 
simple, basic proposition. It's cheating."13 What follows from this simplistic 
TRIB., July 12, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.comlnews/opinionlchi-0712edit 
2juI12,0,6352361.story (stating that athletes "game the system" and get away with using 
performance-enhancing substances because they know that the chances of getting caught are small). 
9. Shermer, supra note 8; Peter Brown, The Doping Game: Payoff.s that Make Cheaters into 
Losers, SCI. AM., Apr. 2008, at 88. 
10. Brown, supra note 9. 
II. Jan Todd & Terry Todd, Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic 
Movement: 1960-1999, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC 
MOVEMENT, supra note 4, at 65,74. 
12. Bobby Julich, My Generation Must Continue to Tell Young Riders Not to Cheat, ESPN.COM, 
July 18, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.comloly/tdf2007/news/story?id=2941115 (stating that athletes 
who are doping are "making poor choices"). 
13. Hearing to Examine the International Convention Against Doping in Sport, adopted by 
UNESCO on Oct. 19, 2005 as Treaty Doc.1l0-14: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign 
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explanation for doping in sports is that because individuals cannot be trusted 
to do the right thing, the government must step in to protect the integrity of 
sport. The assumption is that the government has little role in sports doping, 
and is essential to the solution. In the words of Edwin Moses, former United 
States Olympic gold medal winner, 
The United States is unique among Western democracies in 
not having a ministry of sport, because Americans generally 
believe that less government is good and that private 
organizations and the market can be trusted to do work that 
affects the public trust. Whatever the merits of this 
perspective in other contexts, the traditional deference to the 
private organizations that govern sport is not warranted in the 
case of doping ... Notwithstanding the efforts of some well-
intentioned individuals, sports governing bodies in this 
country and internationally have shown time and time again 
that they are not structurally equipped for this work, nor are 
they sufficiently accountable to the larger interests of society 
that are affected by doping. 14 
The sentiment expressed by Moses and many others is premised on the 
notion that the government is a dispassionate third party in the relationship 
between the nation and elite sport. To be sure, doping is cheating, but the 
temptation to cheat and the ability to pull it off is manifest well beyond the 
level of the individual athlete. With elite Olympic Movement sport, the 
individual is connected to the national community, and the national 
community is connected to the international community through a sporting 
ideal that is both international in scope but nationalistic in execution. It is also 
a sports paradigm that, at the highest levels, values winning over all else. Far 
from being on the sidelines in this system, the United States government has 
been and continues to be an important player in the American Olympic 
Movement. 
III. SPORT AND THE TEMPTATION OF THE STATE 
The explanation of doping as an individual problem that grows out of bad 
individual choices obscures the role that the United States government has 
played in allowing the practice to take root. It also overlooks the nature of the 
sporting environment in which the government's role was shaped. Thus, to be 
Relations, 1 10th Congo (2008) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Chairman). 
14. Edward H. Jurith & Mark W. Beddoes, The United States' and International Response to the 
Problem o/Doping in Sports, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 461, 477 (2002). 
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able to examine critically the government's role in doping in sport, It IS 
important to understand the relationship between the Government and 
Olympic Movement sport and the origins of the current American Olympic 
Movement structure. This relationship takes place in a sort of legal twilight 
zone, caught between the private sector and the public interest. 15 Within this 
twilight zone there is a collision between the nominally private status of sports 
regulators in the United States and the powerful temptation on the part of the 
government to use elite sport to demonstrate national supremacy through 
winning. 
A. The Use of Sport in the National Interest 
Scholars have long recognized that sport can be used in multiple ways to 
enhance nationalism. First, sport can be a powerful force for nationalism 
domestically.16 Second, sport can be used to enhance a nation's prestige and 
demonstrate supremacy in the international community. 17 Scholars have 
noted that "nations are dependent upon the international sports world to 
confirm their national stature," and in fact "the establishment of an 
international athletic presence is not, therefore, a gratuitous matter for nations, 
but rather the path they must currently follow if they expect to be recognized 
and treated as a nation."18 Thus, for most, if not all nations, elite sport is in 
many respects viewed as a tool; it is not simply valued for the sake of its 
inherent characteristics. 19 Political leaders often use sport to demonstrate the 
superiority of their political system,20 and nations of all ideologies have long 
recognized that athletic success, particularly within the Olympic Movement, 
15. Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine's Application to Amateur 
Sports, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 183, 184 (2008) [hereinafter Koller, Frozen in Time]. 
16. See Alan Bairner, Sportive Nationalism and Nationalist Politics: A Comparative Analysis of 
Scotland, the Republic of Ireland, and Sweden, 20 J. SPORT & SOc. ISSUES 314, 314-15 (1996). 
17. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 461-462; RICHARD ESPY, THE POLITICS OF THE 
OLYMPIC GAMES 7-8 (1979); James A.R. Nafziger, Legal Aspects ofa United States Foreign Sports 
Policy, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 837, 839-840 (1975). 
18. William 1. Morgan, Sport and the Making of National Identities: A Moral View, 24 J. PHIL. 
SPORT 1,3 (1997) (explaining that "[s]ince nations not only see themselves in this regard as members 
of a larger, international community, but actively curry the favor of that community in seeking 
validation of their own nationality, the bond between the national and international is equally strong 
here.") 
19. JoAnne D. Spotts, Global Politics and the Olympic Games: Separating the Two Oldest 
Games in History, 13 DICK. 1. INT'L L. 103-115 (1994); Jeffrey M. Marks, Political Abuse of Olympic 
Sport - DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, 14 N.Y.U. 1. INT'L L. & POL. 155 (1981); 
James A.R. Nafziger & Andrew Strenk, The Political Uses and Abuses of Sports, \0 CONN. L. REV. 
259,259 (1977); Nafziger, supra note 17, at 838. 
20. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 461; MARTIN BARRY VINOKUR, MORE THAN A GAME: 
SPORT AND POLITICS 17 (1988). 
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furthers national interests. 21 This use of sport is referred to as "sportive 
nationalism," which is defined as "the use of elite athletes by governments to 
demonstrate national fitness and vitality for the purpose of enhancing national 
prestige.,,22 As one scholar has explained, "[s]portive nationalism is not a 
single generic phenomenon; on the contrary, it is a complicated socio-political 
response to challenges and events, both sportive and non-sportive, that must be 
understood in terms of the varying national contexts in which it appears."23 
Nearly all nations to some degree use elite sport to enhance national 
prestige. 24 This practice is most evident in Olympic Movement 
competition. 25 Not surprisingly, sportive nationalism takes different forms in 
different nations, "depending on the nature of the government that seeks 
prestige benefits from international sporting success."26 The sporting 
paradigm in which expressions of nationalism take place is one that 
emphasizes, above all else, winning. 
There are several notorious examples of sportive nationalism. A leading 
case is the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, used by Hitler's regime as one part of 
its propaganda campaign to promote Nazi ideology.27 The Games were 
21. Spotts, supra note 19, at 115; Nafziger, supra note 17, at 838; Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 
19. 
22. John Hobennan, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE WORKSHOP, 
RESEARCH ON DOPING IN SPORT 7 (The Research Council of Norway, 2001) [hereinafter Hobennan, 
Sportive Nationalism and Doping]; John Hobennan, How Drug Testing Fails: The Politics of Doping 
Control, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT, supra 
note 4, at 241, 260 [hereinafter Hobennan, How Drug Testing Fails]. 
23. Bairner, supra note 16, at 315. 
24. ESpy, supra note 17, at 4 ("All states use sport as a diplomatic tool."); Hobennan, Sportive 
Nationalism and Doping, supra note 22, at 7, 9 (stating that "to the best of my knowledge, no sitting 
government has ever renounced sportive nationalism as its fundamental approach to international 
athletic competition," and that "[s]portive nationalism continues to prevail as national policy around 
the world. .. ."); VINOKUR, supra note 20, at III ("Governments and countries throughout the 
world - regardless of political system - now seem to recognize that international sports victories have 
a new political meaning."). 
25. Scholars have pointed out that despite the lofty ideals, the Olympic Games have always been 
a potent force to promote nationalism. ESpy, supra note 17; EAST PLAYS WEST; SPORT AND THE 
COLD WAR (Stephen Wagg & David L. Andrews eds., Routledge 2007); Barrie Houlihan, Building an 
International Regime to Combat Doping in Sport, in SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN 
EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 62, 74-75 (Roger Levennore & Adrian Budd eds., Routledge 2004) 
(explaining "over the last 40 years, many, indeed most, of the major sporting states have, at worst, 
ruthlessly exploited international in general and the Olympic Games in particular for a variety of 
ideological and nationalistic purposes ... few states have been prepared to value sport for its intrinsic 
qualities."). 
26. See generally Hobennan, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, supra note 22, at 7. 
27. ROB BEAMISH & IAN RITCHIE, FASTEST, HIGHEST, STRONGEST: A CRITIQUE OF HIGH-
PERFORMANCE SPORT 32-35 (2006) (explaining that the 1936 Olympics provided Hitler with a 
"propaganda victory" because of its impressive organization of the Games as well as its athletes' 
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awarded to Germany to help restore it in the world community after its defeat 
in World War I, and Hitler's regime developed a state-sponsored sports 
training program to develop athletes for the Games and support Hitler's vision 
of Aryan supremacy.28 In the Post World War II era, East Germany 
successfully used sport as a tool to achieve its foreign policy objectives. 29 As 
it was in the former Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries, the 
government completely controlled the sports system, which emphasized, 
above all else, winning. 30 The ultimate goal was to demonstrate the 
superiority of the East German political system3) and to gain acceptance as 
part of the international community.32 It was long suspected, and subsequently 
confirmed, that the government-sponsored sports program included the 
systematic administration of performance-enhancing substances, such as 
anabolic steroids, to many of its male and female athletes to increase their 
success in Olympic Movement competition. 33 The East German program had 
convincing results, from both a sporting and diplomatic view. East Germany 
won record numbers of medals in international competition34 and during this 
time "gained diplomatic recognition by a majority of the states of the 
world."35 Similarly, the Soviet Union used international athletic competition 
to great political advantage, relating its athletes' success to what it claimed 
was the "superiority of the Soviet political system."36 Today, China is a 
leading example of using sport for political purposes. It hopes that by hosting 
the Beijing Olympics it can solidify its place in the modem international 
successful perfonnance). 
28. [d. 
29. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 463-64. VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 59; Nafziger & 
Strenk, supra note 19, at 262 ("The Gennan Democratic Republic has used sports to gain diplomatic 
recognition more aggressively and successfully than any country in the world." East Gennany 
worked '''to use sport as a lever to remove the barriers which isolated them from the Western 
World."). 
30. VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 98. 
31. [d. at 88. 
32. [d.; ESpy, supra note 17, at 32-35. 
33. Houlihan, supra note 25, at 64 (describing East Gennany and the Soviet Union as 
"subversives" within the early movements to combat doping in sport, and explaining that in both 
nations "state organized doping was fmnly established behind a public front of pompous 
condemnation of drug use as contrary to the spirit of Olympism and a problem confmed to the 
commercialized West."). 
34. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 19, at 264. 
35. VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 59. 
36. [d. at 98, 109 (explaining that "[t]he leaders of the Soviet Union have always considered 
sport to be a key aspect of international politics," and that "a frequent Soviet media tactic ... is to 
proclaim that Soviet sports victories are another verification of the superiority of the Soviet system"). 
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B. Sportive Nationalism in the United States 
The United States has long embraced the win-at-all-costs sports paradigm 
that prevails today. In Olympic Movement competition, this has meant medal 
targets and performance bonuses for medal winners. More generally, this 
reflects the fact that in the United States, it is being the best and not just 
showing up that is rewarded. Yet, expressions of sportive nationalism in the 
United States present a challenge to our government. On the one hand, our 
nation revels in American athletes' success. At the same time, the United 
States wants to make it clear that while Olympic victories reflect well on our 
political system, they are not a product of it. It is sportive nationalism with a 
capitalist twist, and there are no legal restraints to using sport in this way.38 
Unlike nations such as the former East Germany and the Soviet Union, the 
United States government traditionally did not use Olympic Movement sport 
as an international relations tool. 39 Nevertheless, over the last thirty years, 
sportive nationalism has been a significant part of United States' foreign 
policy.4o Yet despite the many examples41 of United States sportive 
37. Paul Mooney, Preparing for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, China's Authorities Go After 
Human-Rights Advocates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REpORT, Feb. 14, 2008, available at 
http://www.usnews.com!articles/news/worldl200S/02/14/preparing-for-the-200S-beijing-olympic-
games-chinas-authorities-go-after-human-rights-advocates.htm1.; S. L. Price, Olympic China, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 13, 2007, at 72; Orville Schell, What Drives China: The Roots of a National 
Inferiority Complex, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 2008; Amy Shipley and Maureen Fan, In Run-Up to 
Beijing Games, a Gold Rush: China Defines Success by Precious Medals, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2008, 
at A I. China has long been accused of using doping to achieve international athletic success. 
Throughout the 1990s, Chinese athletes in sports such as swimming were breaking long-held world 
records and winning gold medals as they never had before. See also generally Todd & Todd, supra 
note II. 
3S. See generally Nafziger, supra note 17. 
39. Id. 
40. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 19, at 259; VINOKUR, supra note 20, at lOS. 
41. Most commonly, of course, sportive nationalism is apparent in political rhetoric, with 
govemment officials often stating that American athletes reflect what is best about the United States. 
For instance, as stated by President Bill Clinton, in an address to Olympic athletes competing in the 
1996 Atlanta Olympic Games: "So tonight when you walk into that opening ceremony ... you carry 
the symbol of all that we have become, not only in fact, but in the eyes and spirit and the hopes of the 
rest of the world. And just as surely as those of us who work in the diplomatic area or the fine people 
who wear the uniform of the United States military, you will become a symbol ... you are a source of 
enormous pride to our country and an inspiration to the world." Remarks to the United States 
Olympic Team in Atlanta, Georgia, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1156, 115S (July 19, 1996). President George W. 
Bush reflected the same sentiments of the United States' athletes as "symbols" or "ambassadors" of 
the United States, stating that: "For our athletes, a place on America's team is the culmination of 
years spent training and competing. They are proving that persistence and teamwork can help meet 
high goals. They are performing with honor, conducting themselves with humility, and serving as 
100 MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 19:1 
nationalism, the government, and by extension, sports officials, the media,42 
and the American public downplay, and even ignore the obvious relationship 
between sports and international relations."43 Indeed, to distinguish the United 
States from countries like the former Soviet Union, East Germany and China, 
our government officials have often minimized the role of elite sports in 
international affairs.44 The reality, however, is that the United States over the 
last thirty years has recognized the importance of sport in international affairs 
and has positioned the United States Olympic Movement to enhance the 
nation's prestige. 45 
In doing so, the United States government effectively filters its sportive 
nationalism through a privatized Olympic Movement structure, codified by the 
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, which provides no role for the government in the 
regulation of sport. 46 This structure was a deliberate effort to contrast the 
United States with the Communist sports systems of the former Eastern Bloc. 
In the 1970s, the overwhelming success of the Soviet Bloc in international 
competition, during the height of the Cold War, put pressure on the United 
States to match their sporting success. 47 Our comparative weakness in 
ambassadors of peace and goodwill to the entire world. By showing respect for every competitor, 
they are showing America's respect for the world .... " The President's Radio Address, 40 WEEKLY 
COMPo PRES. DOC. 1603, 1603 (Aug. 14,2004). In addition, the United States' efforts in hosting 
multiple Olympic Games evidence sportive nationalism. Since 1984, the United States government 
has spent at least $2.1 billion (in 1999 dollars) to stage the Los Angeles (1984), Atlanta (1996) and 
Salt Lake City (2002) Olympic Games, and we currently have a bid to host another. United States 
Government Accountability Office Report, Olympic Games: Preliminary Information on Federal 
Funding and Support: Report to Congressional Requesters. 
42. Laura S. Stewart, Comment, Has the United States Anti-Doping Agency Gone too Far? 
Analyzing the Shift from "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" to "Comfortable Satisfaction ", 13 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 207, 219 (2006) (noting the "scant" attention paid by the United States media to 
the revelation that many famous United States Olympic athletes were doping during the 1980s). 
43. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 19, at 259; VINOKUR, supra note 20, at xii (explaining that 
sport's relationship to politics "has been little explored"). 
44. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 19, at 259 (explaining that "United States sports officials, 
journalists, politicians, and the public often ignore the relationship between sports and international 
politics"). 
45. Such a development is consistent with the United States' growing awareness of sport as an 
international relations tool. VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 18 (explaining that "[a]s the awareness by 
governments of the significance of sports in domestic and international politics grows, they will tend 
to increase control of sports to advance their own political goals"). 
46. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 476-77; Dionne L. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to 
the Actions of the United States Anti-Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.1. 91, 94-95 (2005) 
[hereinafter Koller, Does the Constitution Apply]. 
47. Nafziger, supra note 17, at 854 ("The United States government clearly should develop a 
comprehensive and coherent foreign sports policy. .. ."); Peter J. Beck, "The Most Effective Means 
of Communication in the World"?: British Sport and National Prestige, in SPORT AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 77, 84 (Roger Levermore & Adrian 
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international competition prompted President Ford to establish the 
Commission on Olympic Sports (the "Commission") to study the issue. The 
Commission noted at the outset that "in international sport... American 
performances are deteriorating. Against athletes from nations for whom 
Olympic medals are as precious as moon rocks, U.S. competitors seem to have 
steadily diminishing chances of success."48 The United States understood by 
this time that the international sporting community supported a form of sport 
and competition that emphasized nationalism and winning.49 
Given this, the result of the Commission's work was a uniquely American 
style for Olympic Movement sport regulation, and by extension, our 
nationalistic uses of sport that focused on fostering "individual athletic 
achievement." so Unlike many countries that participate in the Olympic 
Movement, the United States does not have an official government agency or 
ministry for sports. Instead, the Commission's primary recommendation was 
to create a centralized sports organization that had the exclusive right to select 
athletes for Olympic Movement competition.sl The Commission rejected a 
role for the federal government, preferring instead to rely on privately 
incorporated National Governing Bodies (NGBs) to develop athletes. 
As a result of the Commission's report, Congress passed the Amateur 
Sports Act of 1978, which restructured what was the former USOC so that it 
would function as an institution to coordinate the United States' amateur 
athletic development. 52 The Act gave the USOC the exclusive power to 
"coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United States, directly 
related to international amateur athletic competition ... " and "to obtain for the 
United States, directly or by delegation to the appropriate national governing 
body, the most competent amateur representation possible in each event of the 
Olympic Games," among other things. 53 The Act made the USOC a federally 
chartered, non-profit private corporation,s4 not a government agency, with the 
Budd eds., 2004); As stated by the House Judiciary Committee: "the overall decline of American 
achievement in Olympic and international competition was apparent. For a nation of almost 250 
million people, we were falling seriously below our potential to . .. field strong international teams .. 
. . " Amateur Sports Act of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1627, at [pinpoint cite for quote] (1978). 
48. Amateur Sports Act: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 95th Congo 40 (1977) [hereinafter Amateur Sports Act Hearings] (statement of Gerald 
B. Zornow on Behalf of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports). 
49. Morgan, supra note 18 (explaining that the international sporting order links nationalism and 
international interests because the international athletic community encourages nationalistic displays). 
50. Amateur Sports Act Hearings, supra note 48. 
51. Id. 
52. S. F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. V. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 554 (1987). 
53. Amateur Sports Act of 1978,36 U.S.C. § 220503(2), (4) (2006). 
54. Id. § 220502(a)-(b). 
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authority to oversee the various NGBs for all recognized Olympic sports. The 
NGBs establish specific eligibility criteria for athletes in their respective 
sports. In addition, the Act gives the USOC the authority to represent the 
United States in relations with international athletic bodies, to resolve conflicts 
and disputes related to Olympic athletics, and to provide financial assistance to 
organizations in furtherance ofUSOC goals. 55 
Despite the fact that in 1978 Congress was well aware of the problems 
with performance-enhancing drug use in Olympic Movement sports, neither 
the Commission nor the resulting Amateur Sports Act mentioned the issue. 
Instead, the Act specifically aimed to maximize the United States' prestige in 
two ways. First, the United States wanted to produce athletes who would be 
successful in elite international competition. Second, the United States was 
determined to demonstrate its supremacy in the international order through the 
very structure of American Olympic Movement sport. The United States was 
intent on producing winning athletes but it would do so without the 
government control exercised by its Cold War enemies. 
Yet structuring the USOC as a private, and not a government, agency 
represents one of sportive nationalism's most potent legal implications. 
Rather than put amateur athletic development under the control of the national 
government, as it was in Communist nations, the federal government chose to 
structure the United States Olympic Movement through a private, federally 
chartered corporation. 56 Therefore, as with privatization of traditional 
government services, relying on the private sector for Olympic Movement 
regulation "strips away the traditional legal methods for enforcing 
accountability"57 because the requisite "state action" is not present to trigger 
constitutional protections. 58 The only possibility that the Constitution could 
be applied is through the state action doctrine, whereby constitutional 
restrictions are applied to private entities in circumstances where it fairly can 
be said that the state is responsible for the conduct at issue because of its 
relationship to the private actor. 59 Thus, sportive nationalism expressed in a 
way that threatens athletes' rights might be left without a constitutional 
55. Id. § 220505(c)(l)-(6). 
56. Id. § 220503. 
57. Michele Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 
573 (2001) (explaining that due process protections would attach to the denial of welfare benefits 
when the government had control of the program). 
58. The state action doctrine provides that before a right can be asserted under the federal 
constitution, it must be shown that the alleged violation of the right was perpetrated by actions of the 
state. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, et at. 531 U.S. 288 (2001); 
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S 179 (1988). 
59. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
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remedy. 
The private structure and the resulting absence of constitutional 
protections for Olympic Movement athletes might not be of concern if sportive 
nationalism simply could not exist in a privatized Olympic Movement. That 
is, if sportive nationalism involves the government using elite sport to enhance 
international prestige, a question is whether sportive nationalism in the United 
States could even exist in a way that threatens athletes' rights, given the 
private structure of the USOC and now the United States Anti-Doping Agency 
(USADA). The answer is that, in its uniquely American way,60 sportive 
nationalism has proven to survive, and indeed, thrive, in a privatized Olympic 
Movement. The reliance on the private sector however has the potential to 
threaten athletes' rights because when international interests are at stake, the 
federal government has ignored the private status of the USOC in favor of 
pursuing the national interest. 61 Because of sportive nationalism's political 
dimension, courts are hesitant to step in when their expression potentially 
affects athletes' rights. For instance, after the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan prior to the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, President Carter 
and Congress called on the USOC to boycott the Games. 62 The President 
made clear that whatever the USOC decided, he would take all steps necessary 
to enforce his decision not to send a team to Moscow. 63 Not surprisingly, the 
USOC voted not to send a team to the Games. 64 Despite the considerable 
evidence that the federal government, and specifically President Carter, made 
the decision not to send a team to the 1980 Olympic Games, the court, 
considering an athletes' challenge to the boycott, held that the President and 
federal government held only the power of "persuasion" over the USOC.65 
According to the court, the government did not have sufficient "control" over 
the USOC to justify a finding of state action to support the athletes' 
constitutional law claims. Significantly, the court explained that holding the 
President and government's efforts to influence the USOC to boycott the 
Games as sufficient for a finding of state action would bring the courts into a 
60. See generally Hobennan, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, supra note 22 (explaining that 
sportive nationalism can take different fonns depending on the ideology of the government practicing 
it). 
61. See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980); see also James 
A.R. Nafziger, Diplomatic Fun and the Games: A Commentary on the United States Boycott of the 
1980 Summer Olympics, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 67 (1980). 
62. Marks,supranote 19,at 155. 
63. 1d. at 156. 
64. See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. 1181, ajJ'd, 701 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (declining to enjoin 
the USOC from carrying out its resolution of April 12, 1980, not to send a team to Moscow). 
65. Jd. at 1194. 
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"nonjusticiable realm" because of the politics involved. 66 
This "nonjusticiable realm" in the view of the DeFrantz Court included 
using athletes for foreign policy purposes. 67 Significantly, however, the 
DeFrantz Court did not confront the issue of using athletes in a way that 
stripped them of their eligibility to compete at all. The disappointed 1980 
Olympians retained their eligibility for international competition; they were 
denied the opportunity to compete only in the 1980 Olympic Games. It 
therefore remains an open question as to whether a court would step in and 
check sportive nationalism practiced in a way that did not simply deny an 
athlete the ability to compete in one competition, but denied the athlete the 
right to compete at all. 68 Moreover, it is unclear how a court would view the 
actions of USADA, as a strong case can be made that in certain circumstances 
it engages in state action. 69 Accordingly, although the American Olympic 
Movement operates in many ways as a private sector corporation, history has 
shown that the USOC is subject to considerable government influence. 70 
66. !d. 
67. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). In 1987, the Supreme 
Court in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee, ruled in a 5-4 decision 
that constitutional restraints did not apply to the USOC's actions in a case involving the use of the 
Olympic trademark. !d. The Court held that "neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur 
sports has been a traditional government function," so that the restraints of the Constitution did not 
apply to the USOC's actions. Id. at 553-54. The dissent recognized the incongruity of such a 
holding, stating that the "representation function" of the USOC is of particular significance here 
"because an organization that need not adhere to the Constitution cannot meaningfully represent this 
Nation. The Government is free, of course, to 'privatize' some functions it would otherwise perform. 
But such privatization ought not automatically release those who perform Government functions from 
constitutional obligations." !d. at 560 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The irony pointed out by the dissent 
is even greater considering that the United States Olympic Movement was established as a private 
sector endeavor to represent what was superior about the United States political system. However, it 
is apparent that what the Olympic Movement in the United States was really structured to 
demonstrate was the superiority of capitalism, and not necessarily the values of individual rights as 
reflected in the Constitution. Given the changes in the conduct of the USOC and its relationship to 
the federal government as well as the importance of the athletes' interests now affected by decisions 
of the USOC (and USADA), it is not clear whether that holding would be expanded to include an 
athlete eligibility dispute. 
68. I have made the argument previously that court involvement might be justified where 
expressions of sportive nationalism strip athletes of eligibility without appropriate Due Process 
protections. See Dionne L. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes' 
Constitutional Rights in the Pursuit of National Prestige, BYU L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) 
[hereinafter Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices]. 
69. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, at 116-36. 
70. For example, Congress did not hesitate to step in and force reforms to the USOC 
management structure in the wake of corruption and management scandals. Olympic Family -
Functional or Dysfunctional?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and 
Claims of the H. Comm. on the JudiCiary, 109th Congo (2005); Legislative Efforts to Reform the u.s. 
Olympic Committee: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the 
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Yet, notwithstanding the fact that the government has shown its 
willingness to step in with the "private" American Olympic Movement when 
necessary to protect the national image, the government and the public persist 
in viewing sport as a private matter. Even beyond the boycott situation, courts 
have reinforced this view, further reflecting the practice of sportive 
nationalism that has, since the Commission report, cultivated an image of 
American Olympic Movement sport as an individual, private sector pursuit. 
For instance, the Supreme Court held in San Francisco Arts & Athletic v. 
United States Olympic Committee that the USOC's role is a private sector one, 
and not a public function. Although the Court did not deal with an athlete 
dispute,71 the Court's opinion in San Francisco Arts viewed the regulation of 
amateur athletics as fundamentally private, and not a government 
prerogative.72 The dissent, in contrast, emphasized the real-world foreign 
relations functions that the United States Olympic Movement serves: 73 
Although at one time amateur sports was a concern merely of private 
entities, and the Olympic Games an event of significance only to individuals 
with a particular interest in athletic competition, that era is passed. In the 
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Congress placed the power and prestige of the 
United States Government behind a single, central sports organization. 
Congress delegated to the USOC functions that Government actors 
traditionally perform - the representation of the Nation abroad ... 74 
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2003); Does the US. Olympic Committee's 
Organizational Structure Impede its Mission: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, 
and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2003); US. 
Olympic Committee Reform Act of 2003: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 108th Congo (2003); State of the Us. Olympic Committee (USOC): Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Congo (2003); Investigation of the 
Olympic Scandal: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th 
Congo (1999); Oversight of Activities of the Olympic Committee: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Congo (1994). 
71. The facts of San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee pertain to 
the use of the word "Olympic" by a non-U SOC entity. 483 U.S. 522, 525-527 (1987). The non-profit 
sponsor of an event it called the "Gay Olympic Games" found itself embroiled in a lawsuit with the 
USOC which denied the "Gay Olympic Games" sponsor the use of the Olympic trademark. /d. at 
527. 
72. Id. at 543-45. 
73. Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The USOC performs a distinctive, traditional 
governmental function: it represents this Nation to the world cornmunity . . .. As the Olympic Games 
have grown in international visibility and importance, the USOe's role as our national representative 
has taken on increasing significance. Although the Olympic ideals are avowedly non-political, 
Olympic participation is inescapably nationalist."). 
74. Id. at 559-60. The representation function of our athletes in the Olympic Games, and the 
presence of our political leaders at the Games are apparent in the current climate. Although the 
United States openly opposed, in 1993, China's bid to host the Olympic Games in 2000 because of 
human rights issues, President Bush has recently stated that he would attend the opening ceremonies 
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Justices Brennan and Marshall further underscored this point, stating that 
"the [Amateur Sports] Act gave the USOC authority and responsibilities that 
no private organization in this country had ever held."75 The dissent 
explained that this function has become increasingly important as the Olympic 
Games have grown in importance. 76 The dissent asserted that Congress put 
the "power and prestige of the United States Government" behind the 
USOc. 77 It is now doing the same with USADA. Thus, the notion that 
Olympic Movement sport in the United States is simply the result of private 
and not public action likely has more value as Cold War propaganda than a 
basis in reality. The conduct of the American Olympic Movement can be 
traced back to our government just as surely as if there was an official 
government ministry for sport. That is because the conduct of the American 
Olympic Movement is not just reflected in the government's actions, but in the 
government's decision not to take action. Thus, whatever the benefits of the 
"private" distinction, it enabled the United States to ignore the issue of sports 
doping for decades while reaping the benefits of international sporting success. 
IV. SPORTIVE NATIONALISM AND DOPING 
As explained above, the sporting paradigm in which the Amateur Sports 
Act was passed, and the "private" structure of the American Olympic 
Movement that was crafted, valued, above all else, winning medals. 78 In the 
United States, while winning in Olympic Movement sport was a reflection on 
the government, it was not officially a product of it. However, scholars have 
long argued that it is impossible to distinguish "private" from "public" acts 79 
because all conduct can be traced to some decision of the state to either 
affirmatively permit conduct, or a decision not to prohibit it. 80 It is in this way 
that sports doping in the United States is a product of government action. That 
is, although it had knowledge of the doping problem, the government did little 
to intervene when our Olympic, and later professional, athletes used 
of the 2008 Games in Beijing, noting the sensitive foreign policy implications ifhe were not to attend. 
75. Id. at 557. 
76. /d. at 550. 
77. Id. at 559. 
78. Shipley, Goals of United States Team, supra note 3 (explaining the USOC's practice of 
establishing "medal targets" for the United States' participation in the Olympic Games). 
79. See Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the 
Independence of Constitutional Law, IO CaNST. COMMENT. 329, 334 (1993). "The overwhelming 
weight of published academic opinion has rejected the premise that legal doctrine can rest on a 
supposed distinction between public and private acts." /d. 
80. Id.; Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1349,1351 (1982). 
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performance enhancing substances to substantially increase their chances of 
achieving success. This is because the "medals" paradigm in which the 
Amateur Sports Act was passed gave the government every incentive to do 
nothing. 
A. Cold War Sportive Nationalism - Medals Without Morality 
Because of the undeniable advantages that athletes using performance 
enhancing drugs have over those who do not,81 sportive nationalism in a 
"medals" paradigm creates temptations for governments either to affirmatively 
dope athletes to achieve success in international competition, like the former 
East Germany, or, as the United States government did, tum a blind eye and 
allow sports doping to take place. Thus, the traditional thinking has been that 
sportive nationalism undermines efforts to fight doping in O1ympic Movement 
sport because it creates incentives for governments to tolerate doping to 
achieve athletic success. 82 Critics have suggested that sportive nationalism 
"can only encourage" a nation's tacit acceptance of doping. 83 This was 
certainly the case with the United States, which did little to stop doping in 
sports for decades. 84 The focus for the United States, it seemed, was not 
combating performance-enhancing drug use, but combating the Eastern Bloc's 
success in Olympic Movement competition. 
This approach was possible because of the structure of the American 
Olympic Movement that was established by the Amateur Sports Act. Without 
any specific mention in the Act, and consistent with the government's 
emphasis on the free market to develop world-class athletes, the effort to 
control doping by Olympic Movement athletes was left to the private sector. 
81. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 463-64 (explaining that doping "increases the chances of 
winning"). 
82. See generally Hobennan, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, supra note 22. The link between 
sportive nationalism and steroid use has strong Cold War roots. This link likely started with World 
War II, as scholars have described the way the United States and Europe were "haunted" by anabolic 
steroids because of the widely-held belief that Nazi soldiers were routinely injected with steroids to 
make them "hyper-masculinized, ultra-aggressive" fighters. This use of steroids continued after the 
war, and became a feature of the sportive nationalism that was an important part of the political life of 
Communist, totalitarian regimes. This use of perfonnance-enhancing substances to heighten athletic 
perfonnance, in the words of one commentator, "stalked" Western Europe and the United States 
because the steroid enriched Nazi soldiers had been replaced "with testosterone-enriched male and 
androgenized female communist athletes" who dominated much of Olympic Movement competition. 
BEAMISH & RiTCHIE, supra note 27, at 31. 
83. Hobennan, How Drug Testing Fails, supra note 22, at 262; Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, 
at 463-464 (explaining that "doping has been condoned at virtually all levels of sports administration 
because it increases the chances of winning ... "). 
84. Stewart, supra note 42, at 211; Houlihan, supra note 25, at 64 (explaining that the United 
States Govemment, at best, was "apathetic" on the issue of doping). 
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The USOC administered drug testing through each sport's NGB, which was 
also charged with prosecuting athletes for doping violations under the NGB's 
own administrative procedures. 85 Accordingly, the USOC and NGBs, which 
were charged with selecting athletes for Olympic and international 
competition, also administered drug testing and determined the sanctions. 86 
This arrangement prompted critics to argue that the USOC and NGBs had an 
inherent conflict of interest that prevented them from administering a credible 
drug testing and sanctioning program. 87 
The pressures on athletes to dope, and the subsequent conflict of interest 
inherent in the testing and sanctioning regime administered by the USOC, did 
not go unnoticed by Congress. For instance, as early as 1973, even before the 
Amateur Sports Act was passed, Congress held a hearing on doping in 
sports. 88 At that hearing, Congress heard testimony from a former Olympian 
who effectively stated that sportive nationalism led individual athletes to 
doping. As stated by Phil Shinnick, 
Athletics should be defined by the individual, but 
unfortunately, in American sports and in our society, there 
seems to be a structure that has a high emphasis on 
winning ... there seems to be political pressures on athletes 
especially during these times, to win ... for the country ... 
When I was assistant chief of the mission to the 1965 World 
University Games in Budapest... I was under constant 
pressure from the gentlemen at the State Department to beat 
the "Commies.89 
Shinnick also testified unequivocally that American athletes, including 
himself and several other Olympic champions, used performance-enhancing 
substances such as anabolic steroids and amphetamines. 90 Similarly, former 
Olympic Gold medalist Harold Connolly powerfully testified that "by 1968, 
85. Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: USADA Takes over 
Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, I DEPAUL 1. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 
126 (2003); Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 476. 
86. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4) (2006). The USOC is directed "to obtain ... the most competent 
amateur representation possible in each event of the Olympic Games." Id. 
87. Tygart, supra note 85, at 126; Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 476. 
88. See Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. to 
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Congo (1973). 
89. Id. at 139 (statement of Phil Shinnick, Director of Athletics, Livingston College, Rutgers 
University). 
90. !d. at 134-39. 
2008] FROM MEDALS TO MORALITY 109 
athletes in every event were using anabolic steroids and stimulants."91 
Connolly described the "state of openness" that had developed to the point 
where, at the 1968 Olympic trials, "any number of athletes on the 1968 
Olympic team ... had so much scar tissue and so many puncture holes in their 
backsides that it was difficult to find a fresh spot to give them a new shot. "92 
Public examples of athlete doping continued through the 1970s and 1980s. 
For instance, as mentioned above, at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, 
weightlifter Mark Cameron was disqualified for steroid use. The USOC did 
not support the disqualification, but instead railed against the International 
Olympic Committee for imposing it. The head of the USOC medical 
delegation acknowledged that Cameron had been doping, but that Cameron 
had taken the chance that he would not be selected for testing and 
miscalculated. Cameron was not dropped from the team and was permitted to 
remain with the team in the Olympic village. 93 At the 1983 Pan American 
Games, twelve members of the United States Track and Field team abruptly 
flew home before competing after sports officials used a new screening 
procedure for testosterone that caught at least fifteen athletes. The track and 
field athletes apparently did not want to risk taking the test. 94 Prior to the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, the USOC's drug testing program 
produced eighty-six positive tests. Nevertheless, the results were not made 
public and no athlete was prevented from competing.95 It was later reported 
that numerous positive test results from the 1984 Games were covered up.96 
These incidents, as well as other evidence of the prevalence of performance-
enhancing drug use in the American Olympic Movement were presented to 
Congress. 97 In 1989, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on "The 
Steroid Abuse Problem in America."98 At that hearing, there was testimony 
91. [d. at 274 (statement of Harold Connolly, fonner Olympic champion; track and field coach, 
Santa Monica High School, Cal.). 
92. [d. 
93. Todd & Todd, supra note 12, at 74. 
94. [d. at 79. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 101. 
97. See Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign 
Commerce, and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Congo 
(1995) (statement of L. Richard Rader, fonner pentathlon athlete) (explaining that in 1986, all 
members of the men's modem pentathlon world championship team tested positive for banned 
substances, yet the USOC allowed them to participate in competition. Rader noted that "Americans 
tested positive in the 1984 and 1988 Olympics. The USOC took no action." He also explained that 
these incidents "gave credence to estimates of doping in pentathlon as high as 70-80 percent during 
the 1970s and 1980s). 
98. Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports - The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid 
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that described how the USOC's pre-Olympic testing program actually helped 
our athletes beat official drug tests, and that "at least 40% of the women's 
[Olympic track and field] team in Seoul ha[d] probably used steroids at some 
time in their preparation for the games. "99 One expert testified that in 1984 
and 1985, the USOC did unannounced drug tests of a variety of sports and 
found that fifty percent of the tested athletes were positive for steroid use. 100 
This expert testified that a member of an NGB had stated that "if we were 
informed we could not select an athlete taking steroids, we simply wouldn't 
have a team." 101 Similarly, there were numerous media reports of 
performance-enhancing drug use by American athletes. 102 For instance, at the 
1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, only two positives were officially announced, 
despite the fact that one of the individuals heading up the testing effort stated 
that many more positives were discovered. 103 In the lead-up to the Atlanta 
Games, the USOC was conducting out-of-competition testing, but with forty-
eight hours notice to athletes. Moreover, the testing was limited to a handful 
of sports. 104 There was evidence that numerous medalists were allowed to 
compete in Olympic competition after failing drug tests. 105 Reports were that 
over 100 athletes who tested positive for banned substances between 1998 and 
2000 were cleared and allowed to compete. 106 
The doping problems, of course, were not simply limited to the Olympic 
Movement, but were a significant problem in professional sports as well. 107 
Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Wist Congo I (1989). 
99. Id. at 7 (statement of Pat Connolly, Coach and Trainer). 
100. Anabolic Steroid Restriction Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Wist Congo 49 (1989) (statement of Dr. Charles Yesalis, Pennsylvania State 
University Professor). 
101. Id.at46. 
102. See generally Todd & Todd, supra note II. 
103. Hoberman, How Drug Testing Fails, supra note 22, at 253. 
104. Todd & Todd, supra note II, at 103. 
105. These individuals were identified in documents released to Sports Illustrated by former 
USOC anti-doping chief Dr. Wade Exum in 2003. CBC Sports, 10 Drug Scandals, CBC.CA, Jan. 19, 
2003, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/indepthidrugs/stories/toplO.html; see also Peter McEntergart, 
Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 21, 2003, at 21. 
106. CBC Sports, supra note 105. 
107. Wilson, supra note 5, at 72-73; see generally Scott B. Shapiro, Who Decides: Institutional 
Choice in Determining a Performance Enhancing Drug Policy for the NFL, 7 WYO. L. REv. 183 
(2007); see generally Paul A. Fortenberry and Brian E. Hoffinan, Illegal Muscle, A Comparative 
Analysis of Proposed Steroid Legislation and the Policies in Professional Sport's CBAs that Led to 
the Steroid Controversy,S VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.1. 121 (2006); see generally David K. Osei, Doping, 
Juicing and Executive Bypass Oversight: A Case Study of Major League Baseball's Steroid Scandal, 
4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.1. 155-56 (2004); see generally Haagen, supra note 6; see generally Mitten, 
supra note 7. 
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This too, was well known to Congress. In 1973, there was testimony before 
Congress that there was a culture of doping in professional football and 
baseball. 108 Nevertheless, despite the ample evidence of doping in the 
American Olympic Movement, Congress did nothing to respond to the 
problem,109 passing the Amateur Sports Act without any mention of doping, 
and taking no action thereafter. During this time, the United States' 
performance in Olympic Movement competition was strong and medal counts 
were up. The incentive was to simply do nothing and allow the "private" 
American Olympic Movement to regulate itself. Additionally, the United 
States was not inclined to take serious steps to fight doping in the American 
Olympic Movement programs, because it was believed that the Communist 
nations were routinely doping their athletes 110 to win, and in international 
relations, winning was the goal. 
It follows, of course, that if sport can be used to enhance a nation's 
prestige, a nation's sporting policy and practice may also diminish it. III This 
was the case for the United States. By the 1990s, our sporting policies had 
yielded substantial success. But those successes were coupled with the 
worldwide belief that our athletes' wins were fueled by doping. 1I2 The 
overwhelming international perception was that the United States was not 
doing enough to fight the use of performance-enhancing drugs by its Olympic 
athletes I \3 and that the USOC simply covered it up.114 The United States was 
108. Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. to 
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Congo 138, 141-143 (1973) 
(statement of Phil Shinnick, Director of Athletics, Livingston College, Rutgers University). 
109. With respect to professional sports doping, it has been noted that Congress left the issue to 
the collective bargaining process because it seemed like an employment issue and not a transcendent 
issue of national importance. Haagen, supra note 6, at 840. 
110. Houlihan, supra note 25, at 66. 
Ill. Beck, supra note 47, at 78 (noting sports "propaganda potential" for reflecting, enhancing, 
and diminishing a nation's international prestige). 
112. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 463 (stating that "regrettably, the United States is 
considered by many to be the worst offender"). 
113. !d. at 475; Tygart, supra note 85, at 124; The Drug Free Sports Act of2005, supra note 5, at 
18 (statement of Frank Shorter, former Chairman, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency) ("In the 1990s, the 
world did not view the United States as being committed to preventing doping amongst its Olympic 
athletes." Shorter also explained that failing to adequately regulate performance enhancing drug use 
in United States sport "undermines the image of the United States and our athletes as being 
committed to drug-free sport."). 
114. Ryan Connolly, Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: The Need to Ensure Fair 
Athletic Competition Through Effective Anti-Doping Programs vs. the Protection of Rights of 
Accused Athletes, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.1. 161-66 (2006); CL Cole, Drafting Kelli White, 28 J. 
SPORT & SOc. ISSUES 219, 219 (2004). 
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even compared to the East Germans. 115 It was suggested that the United 
States be prevented from bidding to host the Olympic Games. 116 In short, the 
international community viewed the United States as "the biggest cheaters in 
the world." 117 In the words of Senator John McCain, Olympic doping 
scandals "harm our image and will contribute to our image, whether deserved 
or undeserved, that the United States is a bully and unethical."118 Also 
hurting our image were the professional sports scandals such as doping in 
Major League Baseball. Although not within their jurisdiction, the World 
Anti-Doping Agency (W ADA) has repeatedly embarrassed the United States 
with its commentary on the lax baseball doping program. 119 By the late 
1990s, the international community apparently had had enough of doping. 
The winning at all costs era, it seems, is over. 120 
B. Paradigm Shift - Morality and Medals 
It was out of this climate that there emerged a new paradigm for sport in 
the late 1990s. While the private sector was delivering athletes who were 
winning, they were no longer enhancing national prestige because of the cloud 
of doping. 12I The United States Government, therefore, recalculated its 
interest to reflect that it is no longer in the national interest to simply have 
athletes who are successful in international athletic competition. It must do so 
with the moral authorityl22 that the United States does not cheat. 123 To that 
liS. S. 529, To Authorize Appropriations for the Us. Anti-Doping Agency: Hearing on S. 529 
Before the S. Conn. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Congo 7 (2005) [hereinafter 
Appropriations for the us. Anti-Doping Agency] (statement of Terrence Madden, CEO, USADA) 
("Some people wanted to equate us with the East German System."). 
116. Cole, supra note 114, at 220. Doping scandals were widely viewed as damaging a nation's 
bid to host an Olympic Games, as it did with China's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games. 
117. Appropriations for the us. Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 115, at 7-10 (statement of 
Terrence Madden, CEO, USADA). 
118. Cole, supra note 114, at 221. 
119. Janice Lloyd, WADA Chief Approves of Congress' Work, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2008, 
available at http://www.usatoday.COm/sPortS/0IymPiCS/2008-02-21-notes-wada-COngreSs_n.htm· 
120.seeKiddetal..Supranote4.atI53 (stating that "as rapid globalization changes each 
nation's often conflicted sense of itself, reactions to doping incidents tum out to be significant 
markers of each country's position in the world diplomatic order"). 
121. See Houlihan, supra note 25, at 69 (explaining that the United States "realized that the 
strengthening association between elite sport and drugs was undermining the utility of sport" in 
international relations); Stewart, supra note 42, at 237 (noting that "doping is an intense international 
issue, the focus of much publicity and controversy"). 
122. Stewart, supra note 42, at 242-43 (characterizing doping as a "moral issue"). 
123. Houlihan, supra note 25, at 69-70 (explaining the change of heart on doping by the United 
States and other Olympic superpowers as "seeking to ensure the continuing utility of international 
sport" for foreign relations purposes). Houlihan also noted that the participation by the United States 
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end, the Executive Branch Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 
and Congress made fighting drug use in Olympic Movement and professional 
sports a top priority. The goal was to help restore the "honor and integrity" of 
United States sport124 and by extension, the United States itself. 
To achieve this, ONDCP announced its national strategy to combat drug 
use and doping in sports. 125 Initially, it was believed that it was necessary to 
form a government agency with "certain governmental or quasi-governmental 
powers" to tackle the issue. 126 With an eye toward restoring our national 
image, ONDCP asserted that governmental status would improve the 
accountability of anti-doping efforts and significantly enhance the United 
States' credibility.127 ONDCP was careful to assert that, while the entity it 
proposed needed to be an instrumentality of the United States, it must also 
reflect the free market view of sports regulation: "We have to be very 
respectful of the notion of amateur sports and the independence of amateur 
sports from federal intervention."128 The ONDCP Strategy also involved 
significant international efforts to develop what became W ADA. 129 
Ultimately, W ADA was established and began operations on November 10, 
1999.130 In August 2000, President Clinton, through Executive Order 13,165, 
facilitated the United States Government's role in the World Anti-Doping 
Agency 131 stating that the Administration was adopting a policy to take 
whatever steps were needed to fight doping in sport. 132 The United States' 
role with WADA was hoped to have a substantial public image payoff. In the 
words of former ONDCP head Barry McCaffrey, "that we created a World 
Anti-Doping Agency in short order is astonishing... it's become an 
institution that in the coming several years... will serve our purposes 
well." 133 In addition to its efforts to establish WADA, the United States 
and other Olympic superpowers was due to a "reassessment" of national interests. See id. at 71-72. 
124. Cole, supra note 114, at 219. 
125. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic 
Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th Congo 
18-23 (statement of Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy). 
126. /d. at 20. 
127. /d. 
128. [d. at 12. 
129. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14,481-82. 
130. World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA History, http://www.wada-ama.org/enldynamic.ch2? 
pageCategory.id=253 (last visited July 15, 2008). 
131. Exec. Order No. 13,165, 3 C.F .R. 288 (200 I), reprinted in 21 U .S.C. § 1701 (2003). 
132. 3 C.F.R. 288 § 1. 
133. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, PROCEEDINGS: FIRST MEETING OF 
THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS 10 (Dec. 7,2000) [hereinafter WHITE 
HOUSE TASK FORCE] (keynote remarks of Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug 
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Government was a leader in drafting the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC), 
which was initially adopted on March 5, 2003. 134 
While the United States Government worked on the international level to 
create WADA, it was also working domestically to create USADA. 135 
Because of its importance to the United States' international image, both 
ONDCP and Congress directly influenced how USADA would be structured 
and what its mission would be. 136 Ultimately, USADA was not given 
government agency status. It was established and began operations on 
October 1, 2000 137 as a private, not-for-profit corporation. 138 Through 
legislation, Congress has "designated" USADA as the "official" anti-doping 
agency for the United States, mandating that USADA conduct all Olympic 
movement drug testing. 139 Congress has also stated that USADA shall 
"ensure that athletes participating in amateur athletic activities recognized by 
the United States Olympic Committee are prevented from using performance-
enhancing drugs or performance-enhancing genetic modifications 
accomplished through gene doping."140 To that end, Congress provides the 
majority of USADA's funding. 141 Curiously, USADA's status and the 
requirement that it conduct Olympic Movement drug testing are not part of the 
Amateur Sports Act. The very brief legislation that outlines its funding and 
duties is part of an Office of National Drug Control Policy funding statute. 142 
However, USADA already has enhanced the United States' image abroad. As 
Control Policy). 
134. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, at 104. 
135. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 475 (stating that "the formation of the United States 
Anti-Doping Agency as an independent testing and prosecuting body for Olympic and international 
competition is intended to restore credibility" to the United States); Wilson, supra note 5, at 76-77 
(explaining that "to prove to the world" that the United States was committed to fair competition, the 
United States created USADA and adopted the WADA Code). 
136. See Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46; see also Appropriations for the u.s. 
Anti-Doping Agency, supra note liS, at 3 (testimony of Jim Scherr, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. 
Olympic Committee) (noting that the committee "had a hand in creating" the USADA). 
137. USADA, USADA History, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/history.html(last visited July 
27,2008). 
138. Tygart, supra note 85, at 127. 
139. See Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, H.R. 6344, 109th 
Congo (2006). 
140. See id. at § 701(b)(2); 120 STAT. 3534. 
141. Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, supra note liS, at 7-10 (statement of 
Terrence Madden, CEO, USADA) (explaining that, "As Jim stated, most of our funding now comes 
from the federal government"). See also Pub. L. 109-469, Office of National Drug Control Policy 
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Dec. 29, 2006 § 703 (authorizing appropriations of $9,700,000 for FY 
2007 and $\0,300,000 for FY 2008). 
142. H.R. 6344 § 701. 
2008] FROM MEDALS TO MORALITY 115 
one fonner USOC official stated, USADA's actions have "largely dispelled 
what was previously a widespread international impression that some 
American athletes were drug cheaters, with their behavior condoned by their 
respective sports federations." 143 
USADA's effectiveness to a large extent depends on its "partnership" with 
the federal government. For instance, prior to the 2004 summer Olympic 
Games, the federal government raided a San Francisco area entity, the now-
infamous Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO), which was distributing 
illegal perfonnance-enhancing substances to professional and Olympic 
athletes. One of the substances, known as "the clear," was specifically 
manufactured to be undetectable in standard drug tests. Shortly after this raid, 
the United States Senate took the "unprecedented" 144 step of subpoenaing the 
secret grand jury documents that were connected to the raid and turning the 
documents over to USADA with the express purpose of disqualifying the 
athletes who apparently had obtained perfonnance-enhancing substances from 
BALCO.145 In addition to BALCO, USADA partners with the government 
regularly to develop evidence and pursue sanctions against athletes. USADA 
has continued to work with the government on a variety of investigations 
involving the sale and distribution of perfonnance-enhancing drugs, and the 
Government has agreed to provide USADA once again with any evidence of 
purchases by Olympic Movement athletes. 146 Athletes who assist in federal 
investigations hope to receive lighter penalties from USADA for their doping 
offenses. 147 
Moreover, because of the success USADA has enjoyed in pursuing 
athletes who dope and in bolstering the United States' image, many members 
of Congress and even the President have urged the professional sports leagues 
143. Appropriationsfor the u.s. Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 115, at 3-7 (statement of Jim 
Scherr, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Olympic Committee) Scherr also noted that the USADA has 
"expanded its scope of activity, increased its aggressiveness and greatly improved its overall 
effectiveness of operation, earning widespread respect both domestically and internationally." Id. at 
22. 
144. Appropriations for the u.s. Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 115, at 2 (statement of Sen. 
Ted Stevens) ("The actions we took as a committee last year ensured that the United States did not 
send athletes who were not drug free to Athens. Those were unprecedented actions .... "). 
145. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, 92-93; Appropriations for the u.s. Anti-
Doping Agency, supra note 114 (statement of Terrence Madden, CEO, USADA) (thanking the 
committee for providing the documents that enabled the USADA to win all of its BALCO-related 
actions against athletes). 
146. See Amy Shipley, A Wider Front in the Doping Battle: Law Enforcement Takes the Lead in 
Sports Probes, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,2007, at AI. 
147. Amy Shipley, Gatlin Will Claim Sabotage in Defense of Doping Charges, WASH. POST, 
July 30, 2007, at AI. 
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to adopt the World Anti-Doping Code and use USADA for testing and results 
management. In 2003, the Chairman of W ADA stated that he was considering 
pressuring the International Olympic Committee (lOC) and international 
sports federations to not hold competitions in the United States because of, 
among other things, the professional leagues' refusal to adopt the WADA 
standards. 148 The President's 2004 State of the Union address, in which he 
urged professional leagues to "get tough" and "to get rid of steroids now," 
followed. 149 In 2005, Congress considered legislation, the Clean Sports Act 
and the Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act, which would 
have required uniform standards for doping control in professional sports. The 
legislation would have made the World Anti-Doping Code, administered by 
USADA, the applicable standard for doping control. I50 This proposed 
legislation and the government's newfound interest in the issue likely had to 
do with the enormous international pressure on the United States to take steps 
to fight doping in professional, and not just Olympic Movement, sports. 
It might be argued that with the government's change of heart on doping, 
the link between sportive nationalism and sports doping has finally been 
severed, or at least has been successfully restrained. The United States' 
initiatives in helping to establish W ADA and establishing USADA suggest 
that a new era in international sport may be afoot, and the sportive nationalism 
that so characterized the Cold War era is now over. Such a view, however, 
fails to understand that sportive nationalism is a flexible concept that can 
respond to the changing politics of the world. Sportive nationalism has not 
been halted by triumphant anti-doping regulation. Instead, it seems that anti-
doping regulation is a more evolved manifestation of sportive nationalism. 
Accordingly, it is no longer winning medals in Olympic Movement 
competition that provides international prestige. The medals must be won 
with moral authority. This change of position was apparent in the lead up to 
the Beijing Olympic Games, as USOC officials have announced that unlike in 
previous Olympic Games, the United States has no medal target for these 
games. 151 Instead, the USOC made it a top priority to "send a clean team to 
Beijing" because of the international consequences of doping scandals. As 
part of this effort, USADA recruited several top American athletes to 
participate in Project Believe, requiring them to submit to extensive blood and 
urine testing in the months leading up to the Games to demonstrate that they 
148. Haagen, supra note 6, at 840. 
149. Address Before a loint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, supra note 6. 
150. See generally id. 
151. Shipley, Goals o/United States Team, supra note 3. 
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are not doping. 152 Whether or not it actually restores the integrity of sport, as 
anti-doping initiatives purport to do, Project Believe has the potential to 
burnish the United States international image and immunize our medal 
winners from speculation that they are cheating. 
v. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTI-DOPING INITIATIVES 
At first blush, the recognition that Congress and the Executive Branch are 
finally taking doping in sport seriously should prompt acclaim, not skepticism. 
However, the recognition that sportive nationalism led the United States to 
ignore and accept athlete doping and is now prompting the United States to 
fight it, does not end the matter. The awareness that anti-doping initiatives are 
rooted in nationalism provides an opportunity to examine the potential 
implications. 
A. Anti-Doping Initiatives are Not Taken Seriously 
While it is hard in the current climate to imagine the anti-doping zeal 
waning, the most obvious implication for our current anti-doping efforts is that 
anti-doping initiatives rooted in nationalism ultimately may not be taken 
seriously. That is, because the international political climate is susceptible to 
change, it may be that the anti-doping effort is not continued with as much 
force as it is today. This could be the case if several nations, which purport to 
adopt the World Anti-Doping Code, do not follow through, and suspicions of 
athlete doping from countries such as China and Russia persist. It might also 
happen if the cost in terms of medals lost is seen as too great. Scholars have 
noted that because there is an "instrumental" view of elite international sport, 
the commitment to fighting doping in sport might not remain as strong as it 
appears to be now because "the perceived utility of international sport" might 
diminish, or the cost, in the form of lowering the current levels of athletic 
success, might be seen as too great. 153 Thus, the long-term appeal of reduced 
athletic performance, and the public's attitude towards it, may not sustain our 
current anti-doping efforts. 154 
Moreover, because the anti-doping effort is not fully integrated into our 
Olympic Movement structure, it is not far-fetched to imagine that such efforts 
could be marginalized in the future. As mentioned above, USADA is not 
152. Id. 
153. Houlihan, supra note 25, at 75. 
154. Thomas Boswell, There's Something in the Air, Other Than Another Ball Headed for the 
Fence, WASH. POST, May 23, 2008, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com!wp-
dynlcontentlarticle/2008/05/221 AR2008052203868.html. 
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mentioned in the Amateur Sports Act. Instead, it is given its status as the 
United States' "official anti-doping agency" and funded through an ONDCP 
grant program, not a dedicated stream of funding. In the past, USADA has 
had to hire lobbyists to secure continued funding.155 Unlike the USOC, which 
was created by statute and has a dedicated, independent source of funding 
through Congress's grant of exclusive use of the Olympic trademarks, 
USADA's structure does not guarantee long term sustainability. 
B. Anti-Doping Initiatives are Implemented in a Way that Threatens 
Athletes 'Rights 
A second potential implication for anti-doping InItIatIves rooted in 
nationalism is that the government temptation to ignore doping and do 
whatever it takes to win is replaced with a temptation to do whatever it takes 
to sanction athletes and clean up sport. Thus, anti-doping initiatives can be 
implemented with the same "be the best" drive that led to the doping problem 
in the first place. Taken to the extreme, the incentive might be to subvert the 
values of due process - fairness, accuracy, and preventing tyranny over the 
individual- in order for the United States to appear strong on the issue. In this 
way, the anti-doping fight itself, instead of the medals won through doping, 
can become a measure of the strength, character, and success of the United 
States. This could lead the government to misuse its power over the Olympic 
Movement to skirt traditional legal protections and be the best doping 
"punisher" in the world. 
This is of concern for two reasons. First, while USADA does operate with 
Congress's designation that it is the "official anti-doping agency" for the 
United States,156 and despite its substantial relationship with the federal 
government, like the USOC, it was deliberately created to be a "private" entity 
that does not have to adhere to constitutional standards. There is evidence that 
creating USADA in this way, despite early calls for it to be a full-fledged 
government agency, 157 was to ensure that the United States could be tough on 
doping without regard to athletes' constitutional rights. At the time USADA 
was created, there were concerns that the United States would not be able to 
establish an effective anti-doping agency because the constitutional rights of 
privacy and due process could make enforcement difficult. 158 Government 
155. Paul Singer, The Straight Dope, NAT. J., Sept. 18,2004, (explaining that US ADA has hired 
two lobbying firms to represent its interests before Congress). 
156. Pub. L. No. \07-67 § 644; lIS STAT. 514, 555 (2001). 
157. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, at \06. 
158. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 133, at 7 (keynote remarks of Barry R. McCaffrey, 
Director, Official National Drug Control). 
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officials even questioned whether notions of due process should apply in the 
sport setting. 159 The government's goal, fueled by concerns over the United 
States' international image, was to aggressively pursue and sanction athletes 
believed to have used performance-enhancing substances. In such a scenario, 
the failure to apply constitutional protections to entities that are so clearly 
acting with government assistance and influence has a paradoxical result. 
Instead of protecting the liberty of such organizations to administer sport 
without government interference in the form of constitutional restrictions, 
deliberately creating "private" entities like the USOC and USADA protects 
the government's ability to wield considerable influence in the regulation of 
athletes. Government is not kept out through the USOC and USADA's private 
status; it is in fact invited in to assert influence without traditional 
constitutional checks. 160 
Second, although the "private" status of the USOC and USADA mean 
constitutional protections do not routinely apply to their conduct in all cases, I 
have previously argued that in some circumstances an argument can be made 
that USADA is a "state actor" so that constitutional limitations would apply to 
its actions. 161 Under these circumstances, an examination of USADA testing 
and sanctioning regime, implemented with government assistance and 
approval, raises significant due process concerns. While doping control is 
premised on protecting individuals, doping enforcement procedures in many 
cases appear more concerned with outcomes and not individuals. 162 Such an 
approach is fundamentally unfair because the government and government-
backed doping regulators enjoy the benefits of sportive nationalism while 
imposing substantial burdens on individual athletes. 
This is so because today's Olympic athletes have a strong claim that they 
have a property right in their sporting careers that would trigger due process 
protections. The due process protections that are given to athletes, however, 
come up short of traditional notions of due process because in many respects 
athletes are not given a meaningful opportunity to protect their eligibility. The 
159. [d. at 35 (statement of Mickey Ibarra, Dir. of White House Intergoverrunental Affairs) 
(explaining that an athlete suspected of doping could be removed immediately from competition 
before a hearing took place, because due process protections "ultimately undermine the effort" to 
clean up sport). Other officials echoed these concerns, questioning whether due process protections 
should have applicability in the fight against doping in sport. !d. at 56 (statement of Scott Blackmun, 
description). 
160. Koller, Frozen in Time, supra note 15, at 232. 
161. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, at 116. 
162. This is demonstrated by the fact that doping violations are considered strict liability offenses 
by the World Anti-Doping Code. "It is not necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing use on 
the athlete's part be demonstrated." World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code, art. 2.1.1, 
8 (2003). 
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current drug testing and adjudication regime administered by US ADA, and 
derived from its agreement to follow the protocols established by W ADA 
through the WADe,163 makes it difficult, if not impossible, for athletes to 
meaningfully defend themselves. USADA has stated that it can ban athletes 
based on circumstantial evidence if the evidence "comfortably satisfied" 
doping regulators that a violation had taken place. 164 Regulators do not need a 
positive drug test but what is instead referred to as a "non-analytical 
positive," 165 circumstantial evidence that is considered to be the equivalent of 
a failed drug test. This low threshold for finding a doping offense is coupled 
with the strict liability nature 166 of doping regulation. Punishment for 
unintentional use of a banned substance is often the same as that for 
intentionally cheating. 167 This strict liability system and the "comfortable 
satisfaction" standard together leave athletes with little room to clear their 
name and unduly risks an unjust result. 168 Moreover, the presumptions built 
in to the hearing procedures also afford athletes little ability to demonstrate 
their innocence. 169 
The sportive nationalism at work in the United States anti-doping 
163. Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of 
Arbitrationfor Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1221 (2005) (explaining that 
"the substantive rules governing whether a doping offense has occurred" is governed by the World 
Anti-Doping Code). 
164. See World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 162; Tom Weir, Runners in the Cross Hairs, USA 
TODAY, June 9, 2004, at Ie. Officials have further explained that this standard is certainly less 
stringent than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, but more than a "mere balance of 
probabilities." Richard H. McLaren, An Overview of Non-Analytical Positive and Circumstantial 
Evidence Cases in Sports, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 193,203 (2006). 
165. Weir, supra note 164. 
166. Doping regulators assert that there is a powerful justification for the strict liability standard, 
specifically the compelling need to protect the integrity of sport for all competitors. Moreover, 
regulators note that requiring a showing of intent before a sanction could be imposed would "invite 
costly litigation" that would "cripple" sporting federations. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 162, 
art. 2.1.1 Comment, at 8-9. 
167. Michael Hiltzik, Presumed Guilty: Athletes See Doping Case Appeals as Futile Exercise, 
L.A. TIMES. Dec. 11, 2006, at AI, available at http://www.latimes.comlsports/other/la-me-
dopinglldecll,0,7716038.story. 
168. The dissenting arbitrator in the Floyd Landis hearing concluded, "Because everyone 
assumes an athlete who is alleged to have tested positive is guilty, it is not fashionable to argue that 
laboratories should comply with strict rules. However, if you are going to hold athletes strictly liable 
with virtually no possibility of overcoming a reported alleged positive test even in the face of 
substantial and laboratory errors, fairness and human decency dictates that strict rules be applied to 
laboratories as well." 
169. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices, supra note 68; Haagen, supra note 6, 
at 838, 848 (describing the W ADA Code as "an extremely athlete-unfriendly document" and noting 
that "given the underlying substantive rules, the procedural rights are likely to be of small comfort to 
the accused"). 
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movement can also provide a strong incentive to disregard procedural 
protections for internationally high-profile athletes so that the United States 
can be viewed by the international community as being aggressive on the issue 
of doping. 170 Moreover, even when doping regulators "follow the rules" as 
written, those rules, with strong United States Government backing, fall short 
of meaningful due process. Given that athletes are no longer amateurs in the 
traditional sense, but are individuals pursuing sporting careers, this process is 
not sufficient. Because of these concerns, commentators have suggested that 
the issue of how to best fight doping in professional sports should be left to the 
collective bargaining process. 171 
C. The Fight Against Doping Can Have Perceived Socio-Economic 
Consequences 
For the fight against doping to retain credibility, it must be perceived by 
athletes and the public as fair. This is true not simply with the methods used 
to test and the procedures used to adjudicate accused athletes, but also with 
respect to who the anti-doping initiatives ultimately catch. Looking to fight 
performance enhancing drug use in the most expedient way possible to bolster 
the United States' credibility could mean that athletes who are members of 
groups traditionally lower on the social-cultural hierarchy, such as racial and 
ethnic minorities, are disproportionately affected. Sport, of course, is not 
divorced from the traditional power relationships in society.ln Just like the 
discretion to prosecute in our criminal system has demonstrated racial and 
socio-economic consequences, it is naIve to think that those same impulses do 
not filter their way into sport regulation. Thus, it is not difficult to conclude 
that in acting on nationalistic impulse to catch cheaters and restore the United 
States' image in the international sporting community, some of the same 
biases that are manifest in the criminal justice system may be manifest in the 
170. Vicki Michaelis, BALCO Creates Inquiry Road Map; Investigation Creates New Ways to 
Out Suspected Performance Enhancers, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2006, available at 
http://www.usatoday.comlsports/2006-09-06-balco-dopin[Lx.htm (explaining that "catching" Floyd 
Landis and Justin Gatlin is "helping to lift the black marks ... on the U.S. image globally ... " and 
that "at a time when the U.S. Olympic Committee is contemplating a bid for the 2016 Summer 
Games, that offers some comfort"). 
171. Haagen, supra note 6, at 846 (asserting that "[t]he W ADA Code explicitly makes a series of 
trade-offs in determining how to combat performance-enhancing drugs, and those trade-offs place 
heavy burdens on participating athletes. Those costs are not speculative, they are real. They include 
invasions of privacy and false positives. Congress should be very slow to take the decisions about 
how to make those trade-offs in American professional sports out of collective bargaining."); see 
generally Mitten, supra note 7. 
172. See generally JAY COAKLEY, SPORT IN SOCIETY: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES (7th ed., 
McGraw-Hill, 2001) (1978). 
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anti-doping fight as well. Such a phenomenon plays out in several ways. 
First, the United States has shown that it is interested in targeting athletes with 
a high international profile and for which there will be a high international 
relations payoff. 173 A number of these athletes are African-American, such as 
Marion Jones and Justin Gatlin, among many others. Second, the focus on 
sports like track and field can have a disproportionate impact on African-
American athletes as track and field is traditionally a sport with a significant 
number of African-American participants, especially sprinters. Track and 
field is one of the most tested sports by the USADA174 Indeed, all of the 
athletes sanctioned by USADA as a result of the Senate providing BALCO 
grand jury documents to USADA were African-American. Moreover, the use 
of criminal law against athletes who have used or are alleged to have used 
performance enhancing substances, such as Jones and Barry Bonds, who is 
under indictment for perjury, also raises concerns. While the facts may 
strongly support the actions taken against these athletes, it is undeniable that 
they were selected for prosecution. In contrast, many white athletes such as 
professional baseball players Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte, also accused 
of performance-enhancing drug use, were largely embraced on Capitol Hill 
during Congressional hearings. These actions can create a perception that 
African-American athletes are cheaters,175 and reinforce long-held, damaging 
social hierarchies. 
Lawmakers and commentators have also noted the "odd" demographics of 
those caught under Major League Baseball's drug testing program. For 
instance, in 2005, it was noted that eight of the twelve players caught were 
Hispanic and nearly all were foreign born. 176 Representative Bobby Rush, in a 
hearing on performance enhancing drug use in professional sports, made the 
same point, stating that while he wanted performance enhancing drug use in 
professional sports eradicated, he also wanted "to be sure that players are 
treated equitably and fairly." Rush explained that of the players suspended 
from Major League Baseball and expelled from minor league baseball, "the 
overwhelming majority of them are Latino or African-American." 177 While it 
may be that all of the athletes targeted for criminal prosecution and 
173. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices, supra note 68. 
174. In its most recent report, the USADA stated that it perfonned 1755 drug tests on track and 
field athletes, by far the largest number for any sport. Athlete Test History, USADA, 
http://www.usantidoping.org/what/statslhistory.aspx (last visited July 28, 2008). 
175. Gregory Moore, Cheaters Like Gatlin, Others Make Track a Modern Day Sodom, Aug. 27, 
2006, http://blackathlete.net/artman2/publish/Track_amp]ield_36/Cheaters_Like_Gatlin_Others_ 
Make_ T rack_A_Modem_Da_2267 .shtml. 
176. Haagen, supra note 6, at 845. 
177. The Drug Free Sports Act 0/2005, supra note 5 (statement of Rep. Bobby Rush). 
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prosecution under sports doping codes are guilty of prohibited performance-
enhancing drug use, it is the perception that those who are caught are largely 
members of minority groups that reinforces negative societal stereotypes and, 
eventually, could pose troubling consequences for the credibility of anti-
doping initiatives. 
D. The Fight Against Doping Can Develop Skewed Ethical Dimensions 
Anti-doping initiatives rooted in nationalism can also have an effect on the 
ethics of the doping debate. That is, where the movement to fight doping in 
sports is grounded at least to some extent on enhancing the United States' 
image, all of us as citizens can claim a stake in punishing offending athletes. 
Such a claim obscures the ethical dimensions of the doping debate by creating 
a new class of rights which can overshadow claims of rights made by athletes 
who feel victimized by overzealous anti-doping regulations. Thus, political 
leaders frequently speak of the fight against performance-enhancing drug use 
as one necessary because doping "cheats us as fans" and as citizens and fans 
we "want to protect the sports that we care so very much about."178 Indeed, it 
is commonly asserted that sport "belongs to all of us here in America." 179 
While such inclusive expressions of sport underscore its nationalistic 
tendencies,180 it also tends to dilute the ethical claims made by athletes that 
anti-doping initiatives are unfair. To the extent we see ourselves as having 
rights in sports we do not play, and to which we have no obligations, but 
merely observe as fans, any claim of right is certainly not as strong as rights 
claimed by those who take on the burdens of sports training and regulation. 181 
It is their rights about which we should be concerned, more than the rights of 
ourselves as fans and citizens. If we do not like what we see in sport, we have 
the right not to watch. An anti-doping fight grounded in nationalism can 
unjustly expand this right not to watch into a right to impose punishment and 
strip eligibility without proper concern for the harm to athletes. 
178. [d. at 6 (statement of Rep. Cliff Steams). 
179. [d. at 14. 
180. Such claims of right also contradict the widely held view, supported by the government, that 
sport is private. 
181. See Angela 1. Schneider & Robert B. Butcher, An Ethical Analysis of Drug Testing, in 
DOPING IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT supra note 4, at 129 
(explaining the questionable ethical dimensions of the fight against perfonnance-enhancing drug use, 
including the fact that there is not a clear basis for banning perfonnance-enhancing substances while 
allowing other perfonnance-enhancing techniques, the invasions of privacy perpetrated by the testing 
protocol, and the coerced consent to testing, which is a prerequisite to the athletes' participation in 
sport). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the greatest consequence of an anti-doping fight rooted in 
nationalism is that in simply responding in the most expedient way possible to 
the image problems the United States had because of doping, our anti-doping 
response has missed an opportunity to consider the real structure of the doping 
problem and take genuine steps to combat it. Thirty-five years ago, before 
anyone seriously considered a government response to doping, a former 
Olympic athlete testified before Congress on drug use in sports and what 
might be done about it. 182 He stated that it was superficial and idealistic to 
view the problem as one at the level of the individual athlete so that the 
individual athlete was the key moral decision maker in the decision whether to 
dope or not. This athlete made an impassioned plea to Congress to examine 
the structure of elite athletics that places on the athlete an enormous pressure 
to win, as the process of participation is subordinated to the goal of 
winning.183 It is this structure, and the government's role in it, that should be 
examined in any sincere attempt to eradicate doping in sport. Without such an 
examination, our anti-doping initiatives are left to stand on the thin and 
transient reed of sportive nationalism. Such a platform does not bode well for 
the long term goal of preserving the integrity of sport. Accordingly, because 
our anti-doping initiatives are anchored in a nationalistic impulse, and not in 
an effort to change the dominant sports paradigm,184 they ultimately may be 
doomed to fail. 
182. Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. to 
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Congo 143-45 (1973) (statement of 
Phil Shinnick, Director of Athletics, Livingston College, Rutgers University). 
183. /d. at 134, lSI (explaining that the structure of American sport "has a high emphasis on 
winning."); see also Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports - The Medical and Social Costs of 
Steroid Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 10Ist Congo 46-47 (1989) (statement 
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